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In recent years, emerging East Asian economies have experienced large capital inflows—
especially a surge in portfolio inflows—and an appreciation of asset prices such as equities, 
land, and both nominal and real exchange rates. The paper reviews why a surge in capital 
inflows can increase asset prices, and then empirically investigates the effects by employing a 
panel vector autoregression (VAR) model. The empirical results suggest that capital inflows 
have indeed contributed to the asset price appreciation in this region, although capital inflow 
shocks explain a relatively small part of asset price fluctuations. How to manage these capital 
inflows is also discussed. 
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I.   Introduction 
The recent surge in foreign capital inflows and increasing asset prices in emerging East Asia
1 
are a major concern for the region’s economic managers. Capital inflows into financial markets 
in particular have been accompanied by exchange rate appreciation, increases in liquidity, and a 
rise in asset prices. Policymakers and academia are concerned that the huge capital inflows 
might be contributing to financial instability and having a negative impact on the real economy. 
Financial market stability is critical to macroeconomic management and these trends have 
therefore become a significant consideration in policy making. 
 
However, the policy options for mitigating the harmful effects of large capital inflows are limited. 
Potential difficulties arise, for example, in complicated policy goals that present trade-offs 
between domestic and external objectives. Discerning the implications of increased portfolio 
inflows requires an assessment of the impact on the region’s capital markets. It is also important 
to understand the context surrounding these capital inflows. This paper documents the trends 
and background of capital inflows and asset price appreciation in the region, empirically 
examines the effects of surging capital inflows on asset prices, and discusses various policy 
issues. 
 
Over the past 25 years, gross capital inflows
2 to emerging East Asia have increased 
significantly. Indeed, they recently surpassed the peak reached just prior to the 1997/98 Asian 
financial crisis. Gross capital inflows to these economies had reached $216 billion by 2005—
from slightly over $140 billion in 1996. In the 1980s and early 1990s bank loans and foreign 
direct investment (FDI) were the primary source of capital flows into emerging East Asia, 
accounting for more than half of all private capital inflows. However, more recently, portfolio 
investments have grown to take up a large portion of the total. The share of portfolio inflows to 
gross capital inflows has held at 31% since 2003, after rising from 14% in 2002. In some cases, 
portfolio flows have become significantly high relative to the size of domestic capital markets, 
with potentially large direct impact on asset prices—both on the way in and the way out.  
 
The current surge in capital inflows, especially portfolio inflows, has been induced by push 
factors related to the global economic environment, and pull factors related to post-crisis 
changes in the region. Given low interest rates and declining asset investment returns in 
advanced economies, investor demand for opportunities in emerging market portfolio assets 
has soared, fueled in part by speculative activities such as the yen-carry trade. At the same 
time, several economies in the region have relaxed regulatory restrictions on foreign portfolio 
investments—through capital market/account liberalization—further spurring portfolio inflows. 
Higher activity among domestic investors resulting from rapid growth of income from the export 
sector—as well as ample monetary liquidity—is another possible factor. 
 
Capital inflows can help domestic economies in various ways: portfolio inflows—or more 
generally capital inflows—can help finance domestic investment and contribute to long-run 
economic growth. Foreign portfolio inflows can provide a better opportunity for local capital 
market development, generally providing increased liquidity and price recovery mechanisms. 
And as foreign capital flows into the market, economic authorities may come under greater peer 
pressure to adopt more internationally accepted practices and standards in financial systems.  
 
                                                           
1  In this paper, emerging East Asia refers to People's Republic of China (PRC), Indonesia, Republic of Korea (Korea), Malaysia, 
Philippines, and Thailand. 
2  Gross capital inflows are defined as the sum of total inflows from foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio investments, and other 
investment transactions by nonresidents.  
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However, large capital inflows may also produce undesirable macroeconomic effects. History 
tells us that rapid capital outflow can often follow periods of rapid inflow, generating boom-bust 
cycles. The initial period of capital inflows is often characterized by real exchange rate 
appreciation, domestic credit expansion, booming consumption and/or investment, and asset 
price bubbles. Over time, the process tends to reverse itself: real exchange rate appreciation 
weakens the current account and reduces the attractiveness of domestic assets to foreign 
investors. Net capital inflows turn into net outflows, and boom turns to bust, with adverse 
consequences for local asset prices and, often, the real economy.  
 
The factors linking capital inflows, credit expansion and lending booms with capital liberalization 
and adverse macroeconomic consequences are not new in emerging East Asia. Several studies 
have pointed this out: Corsetti et al. (1998) suggests that the causes of the 1997/98 crisis lay in 
financial over-lending, banking problems, and the composition, maturity and size of capital 
inflows. Mishkin (1999) also asserts that the crisis started with financial liberalization that 
resulted in a lending boom which was fed by capital inflows—bank lending expanded so rapidly 
that excessive risk-taking prevailed. Excessive bank lending to the real estate sector was also 
noted. Sachs and Woo (2000) point out that too much money was poured into speculative real 
estate projects. Krugman (1998) also states that the problem began with financial institutions 
whose liabilities were perceived as having an implicit government guarantee, but were 
essentially unregulated and therefore subject to severe moral hazard. The excessive risk 
lending by these institutions caused price increases, not of goods, but of financial assets.  
 
Against this background, the effects and policy implications of portfolio inflows on asset prices 
and exchange rates are particularly important in implementing appropriate policy measures to 
deal with the risks. Section II summarizes trends in capital inflows to the region and provides an 
explanation of the recent surge—portfolio inflows in particular. Section III documents recent 
trends in asset prices and exchange rates and discusses the potential effects of capital inflows 
on them. Section IV provides an empirical analysis of the effects of capital inflows and foreign 
portfolio inflows on asset prices using panel vector autoregression (VAR) models. Section V 
discusses policy options, and Section VI concludes. 
 
 
II.   Recent Trends of Capital Flows in Selected Emerging East Asian Economies  
 
For the last 3 decades there have been large and increasing cross-border capital flows between 
economies around the world. Profit-seeking and diversification of risk by domestic and 
multinational financial institutions has contributed significantly. In the 1990s, capital inflows 
started to take on diverse forms as investors from advanced economies spread their assets 
internationally. Cross-border capital flows in general grew rapidly from the 1980s as institutional 
investors diversified to lower risks in their international portfolios. New information and 
communication technologies that enabled global investment and broadened opportunity to 
manage risk through diversified investment fueled the trend. Now, an increasing number of 
institutional investors, including insurance companies, pension funds, and hedge funds are 
investing in emerging markets. At the same time, global cyclical factors such as lower interest 
rates and higher liquidity favor increasing cross-border capital flows.  
 
While this has occurred globally, East Asia's emerging markets have been marked by greater 
capital inflows for several reasons. First, economic fundamentals among the region’s economies 
have improved significantly, as most crisis-affected economies have returned to growth with risk 
premiums down. Second, some currencies in the region are undervalued against the United 
States (US) dollar. And because there is an expectation that the dollar will depreciate further  
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because of the still-large US current account deficit, it seems safe to say that these undervalued 
currencies carry more weight in international portfolios among investors, both in the region and 
internationally. Third, many economies have loosened regulatory requirements on foreign 
portfolio inflows through liberalization of capital controls. Together, these factors have 
contributed to a strong increase in inflows into the region's stock, bond, and real estate markets, 
although the magnitude of impact varies across economies and markets, depending on local 
factors. 
 
A.   Trends in Gross Capital Inflows 
 
As a result of the push and pull factors, gross capital inflows in emerging East Asian economies 
reached over $200 billion in 2005, up 100% over the previous peak in 1997 (Figure 1). At about 
5% of GDP, it remains lower than the 7% of the mid-1990s, but the trend is increasing (Figure 
2). The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been the main destination since 1993—by 2005 
its share of total capital inflows among these economies had increased dramatically to 73%, 
from 17% in 1992.  
 
Figure 3 shows the pattern of capital inflows in these economies, with FDI constituting a major 
component, at 70% of the total. Since the early 1990s, FDI flows into East Asia have increased, 
especially concentrated in the PRC and the southeast Asian countries. Debt financing had more 
weight than equity financing in the late 1980s. Since the early 1990s, however, equity inflows 
have increased, in particular since the Asian crisis, after which most economies in the region 
began removing barriers to foreign investment in equity markets.  
 
B.   Trends in Gross Capital Outflows
3 
 
Gross capital outflows have increased rapidly in recent years, reaching unprecedented levels. In 
emerging East Asian outflows reached over $130 billion in 2005, or 4% of gross domestic 
product (GDP), an increase of close to 400% over the last 10 years. The PRC’s share of capital 
outflows constituted over 60% in 2005, followed by the Republic of Korea (Korea) and Indonesia 
(Figures 4, 5).  
 
Capital outflows are primarily composed of portfolio investments, bonds in particular, which 
comprise over 60% of the total. This reflects a large proportion of PRC and Korean banks’ 
purchases of nonresident debt securities. Growing opportunities for foreign investment by 
institutional investors made available to private investors could constitute an important channel 
for the expansion of capital outflows. In 2006, the PRC announced a set of measures to provide 
individual savers greater access to foreign assets. The Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors 
(QDII) system now allows foreign investment of domestic savings, although the availability of 
such funds is currently limited. Korea also encourages more domestic individual investment 
abroad through mutual funds.  
 
FDI outflows have increased as Asian firms have moved to establish global supply and sales 
networks. Outward FDI from the PRC has grown rapidly. In Korea, FDI outflows have also 
increased as the country’s leading automobile and electronics firms have expanded a sizable 
portion of their production overseas. 
 
There are several considerations regarding the shift in the composition of capital flows to the 
region. The first is that the variability of overall flows may be a bit lower. In general, experience 
                                                           
3  Gross capital outflows refer to resident investment abroad—including FDI, portfolio, and other investments.   
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shows that FDI has been the least variable type of capital flow, bank loans the most, and 
portfolio equity flows nearly as variable as bank loans. However, as stock and bond market 
depth and liquidity increase, there is evidence that the volatility of FDI and debt securities flows 
may increase.
4 Second, there are important differences in the consequences of flow reversals. 
Compared with bank lending, FDI is less subject to sharp reversals. For portfolio investments in 
debt and equity markets, the direct impact of reversals is less likely to severely affect the 
economy because asset equity price adjustments will quickly reduce the balance of payments 
impact of sudden large outflows. There are, of course, potentially significant indirect 
transmission channels to the real economy—through wealth effects on spending and, more 
seriously, potential banking sector exposure to asset markets through securities holdings or 
through credit exposure to investors.  
 
 
III.  Effects of Portfolio Inflows on Capital Markets in Emerging East Asia 
 
A.   Capital Inflows, Asset Prices, and Exchange Rates 
 
Capital inflows may result in an increase in asset prices and an appreciation of nominal and real 
exchange rates. Capital inflows can affect asset prices in three ways. First, foreign portfolio 
inflows can directly affect the demand for assets. For example, capital inflows to stock markets 
increase the demand and, therefore, price of stocks. In addition, portfolio inflows may 
subsequently affect other markets. For example, as capital flows into stock markets, prices 
increase, but the expected return on stocks may decrease. Investors may then seek higher 
returns in other asset markets, such as real estate and bonds, thereby putting upward pressure 
on other asset prices. 
 
Second, capital inflows may result in an increase in money supply and liquidity, which in turn 
may boost asset prices. Capital inflows tend to cause nominal and real exchange rates to 
appreciate. If monetary authorities wish to avoid that they must intervene in the foreign 
exchange market to offset excess demand for the local currency by buying foreign currency. 
This results in an accumulation of foreign exchange reserves and, accordingly, domestic money 
supply. When this leads to an increase in liquidity flows into asset markets, asset prices may 
surge. The foreign exchange intervention may be sterilized by selling government securities 
through an open market operation. However, if sterilization is partial, then liquidity and asset 
prices may increase. 
 
Third, capital inflows tend to fuel strong economic growth—as past studies have shown—and 
lead to an increase in asset prices in several ways. Monetary expansion following capital inflow 
may lead to an economic boom. Falling world interest rates may lead to consumption and 
investment booms, and also lower domestic interest rates, which in turn may boost investment. 
And, for a debtor country, a fall in world interest rates will induce income and substitution effects, 
which may also lead to a consumption boom. 
 
Capital inflows tend to lead to an appreciation of nominal and real exchange rates. Under a 
floating exchange rate regime, foreign portfolio inflows would directly affect the demand for 
domestic currency assets, which leads to appreciation in the nominal exchange rate. Combined 
with sticky prices, the real exchange rate can also appreciate. On the other hand, under a 
managed float, if the monetary authority intervenes in the foreign exchange market the nominal 
appreciation may be avoided. However, the real exchange rate may still appreciate. As 
                                                           
4  See Lipsey (1999), Albuquerque (2002).  
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discussed, consumption and investment booms are likely to increase the price of non-traded 
goods more than the price of traded goods because the supply of non-traded goods is more 
limited than the supply of traded goods. 
 
B.   Trends in Asset Prices 
 
Figure 6 shows equity prices for four ASEAN countries, PRC, and Korea. In these countries, 
stock prices have increased sharply in recent years. From 2003, the upward trend in equity 
prices is very clear in most countries. In Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, and Malaysia, stock 
prices increased steadily from 2003. In the PRC, a sharp increase started in mid-2005, while in 
Thailand, there was a big surge in 2003. 
 
On the other hand, a downward trend in bond yields may be found in recent years (Figure 7). In 
Indonesia and the Philippines, for example, the decline in bond yields was quite substantial. In 
other countries, the decrease was more moderate. Note that the downward trend in bond yields 
only started in late 2005, which is later than the starting point of the upward trend in equity 
prices. This may be due to a spillover effect from equity markets. Most foreign capital flows 
enter through stock markets, partly because emerging East Asia has relatively less developed 
domestic bond markets, which are less open to foreign participation. However, as stock prices 
rise, expected returns on equities drop and local investors bid up bond prices, lowering yields  
 
In addition, land prices have increased in most countries (Figure 8). In Thailand and Indonesia, 
they have increased by more than 50% since 2002. There has also been an upward trend in 
Korea from 2001, while land prices in the Philippines have increased steadily. 
 
C.   Real Exchange Rates, Money Supply, and Reserves 
 
Figures 9 and 10 show nominal and real effective exchange rates, respectively. Recently, a 
clear appreciation trend is found in many countries, although the degree of appreciation varies 
across countries. The Korean won and the Thai baht appreciated steadily from 2003. Other 
currencies have appreciated since late 2005. The recent appreciation trend has also been found 
for real effective exchange rates in all these countries, starting in 2004 or 2005.  
 
Table 1 shows the percentage changes in foreign exchange reserves. Foreign exchange 
reserves of these countries have increased rapidly in recent years. While these economies have 
been running sizeable current account surpluses, they have also piled up large capital inflows. 
The bulk of the current account surpluses and capital inflows have been sterilized and added to 
their reserves because these countries want to stabilize either the nominal or real effective 
exchange rate with the objective of maintaining export competitiveness. Although the 
sterilization of reserve accumulation was substantial, money supply (M2) also tended to 
increase sharply in some countries, which may imply that sterilization was only partial. 
 
As evidenced by the concurrent surges in portfolio inflows, asset price increases, and exchange 
rate appreciation in the data, there may be substance to the assertion that a recent surge in 
portfolio inflows increased asset prices and added to appreciation pressures.  
 
However, some other factors may explain asset price increases and exchange rate appreciation 
in emerging East Asian countries. The recovery from the financial crisis and sounder economies 
may have contributed. Monetary expansion and low interest rates, originating from the 
recession in the late 1990s and early 2000s, may be another factor. The rise against the US 
dollar may also be explained by the massive US current account deficit and national debt  
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problem, which have weighed on the US currency globally. The following section assesses the 
effects of portfolio inflows on asset prices and exchange rates. 
 
 
IV.   Empirical Analysis 
 
A.   Panel VAR Model 
 
The effects of foreign capital inflows on asset prices using panel VAR (vector autoregression) 
models are examined below. VAR models provide a useful methodology: they are data-based 
with a relatively small number of restrictions. The empirical framework is useful in documenting 
empirical facts. And the effects are expected to be inherently dynamic. For example, foreign 
capital inflows may affect different types of asset markets with different timing. VAR models are 
useful in inferring dynamic effects. The panel framework is used because the sample period 
under consideration is relatively short. 
 





t e d y L G + = ) (      (1) 
 
where G(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L, 
i
t y  is an m×1 data vector, d
i is an m×1 
constant matrix, m is the number of variables in the model, and 
i
t e  denotes a vector of structural 
disturbances. By assuming that structural disturbances are mutually uncorrelated,  ) (
i
t e var  can 
be denoted by Λ, which is a diagonal matrix where diagonal elements are the variances of 
structural disturbances. The individual fixed effect, d
i, is introduced to control for the country 
specific factors that are not included in the model but affect each variable.  
 
Data was pooled and estimated using the following reduced form panel VAR with the individual 







t u y L B c y + + = −1 ) ( ,            (2) 
 
where  c
i is an m×1 constant matrix, B(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L, and 
Σ = ) (
i
t u var .  
 
There are several ways of recovering the parameters in the structural form equation from the 
estimated parameters in the reduced form equation. The identification schemes under 
consideration impose recursive zero restrictions on contemporaneous structural parameters by 
applying Cholesky decomposition to the reduced form residuals, Λ, as in Sims (1980). Note that 
our statistical inference is not affected by the presence of non-stationary factors as we follow a 
Bayesian inference (see Sims 1988, and Sims and Uhlig 1991).
5  
 
B.   Empirical Model 
 
In the basic model, the data vector,
i
t y,  is {Y, P, CAP, SP, LP} where Y is output, P is the log of 
                                                           
5  Specifically, we generate the standard error bands based on a Bayesian method, as described in RATS Manual. We also 
experimented with the difference specifications of Y, P, SP, and LP. Results do not change qualitatively.  
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the price level, CAP is capital inflows or portfolio inflows (as a ratio to trend GDP), SP is the log 
of the stock price and LP is the log of the land price.
6 Included are CAP, SP, and LP as they are 
the main variables of interest. Y and P are included to control for the factors that can affect 
asset prices.  
 
The factors or variables affecting domestic asset prices can be divided into three types: First, 
certain factors affect domestic asset prices mostly through changes in foreign capital inflows. 
For example, a change in the foreign interest rate changes foreign capital inflows and thereby 
affects domestic asset prices. Second, certain factors affect domestic asset prices mostly 
through channels other than foreign capital inflows. For example, an increase in the price level 
(which may be the result of monetary expansion) may increase domestic asset prices, but in this 
transmission, foreign capital inflows are not likely to play an important role. Third, there are 
certain factors that affect domestic asset prices, not only through changes in foreign capital 
flows but also through other channels. For example, a change in domestic economic conditions 
induces foreign capital inflows and then affects the asset prices. But a change in domestic 
economic conditions also influences investments by domestic investors and thereby affects 
asset prices.  
 
In the basic model, we control for the second and the third types of factors to analyze the effects 
of capital inflows on asset prices. We include the second type of factor in the model because 
there may be an omitted variable bias if an important factor is not included in the model. We 
also include the third type of factor in the basic model. If we exclude this type of factor in the 
model, then all the effects of this factor, including the effects through channels other than 
changes in capital inflows, may be captured as the effects of foreign portfolio inflows. On the 
other hand, the first type of factor affects the asset prices mainly through the changes in capital 
inflows. Therefore, to analyze the effects of capital inflows, it is unnecessary to include this type 
of factor in the model. 
 
Aggregate output is the most important variable that represents domestic economic conditions, 
which may affect asset prices, both through changes in foreign capital inflows and through other 
channels (the third type). The aggregate price level shows the nominal and monetary condition 
of the economy, which can also affect asset prices (the second type). 
 
Regarding the ordering of the variables, aggregate output and aggregate price level are 
assumed to be contemporaneously exogenous to other financial variables in the system. The 
underlying idea is that real economic activities and the aggregate price level respond to 
changes in economic conditions sluggishly, but the financial sector reflects all the information 
immediately. This type of identifying assumption is suggested by Sims and Zha (2006), and 
widely used in other studies such as Kim (1999), and Kim and Roubini (2000).  
 
In addition, by ordering the aggregate output and the price level before capital inflows, structural 
shocks to capital inflows are constructed as conditioned on the current (and lagged) aggregate 
output and the price level. Given the desire to control for those variables in identifying structural 
shocks to capital flows, this ordering is ideal. 
 
On the other hand, capital inflows are assumed to be contemporaneously exogenous to asset 
prices. This type of assumption is used by Kim, Kim, and Wang (2004), Froot, O’Connell, and 
Seasholes (2001), and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lumsdaine (2002). In principle, stock prices can 
                                                           
6  A linear trend in GDP is assumed. Assuming different trend types, such as quadratic trend, does not significantly affect the 
results.   
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affect foreign portfolio inflows. High past returns may signal high future returns when momentum 
is an important determinant of expected return. Therefore, high past returns may induce foreign 
portfolio inflows. However, even in momentum trading, a very transitory change in asset prices 
is not likely to significantly affect foreign portfolio inflows. Therefore, the assumption of 
contemporaneous exogeneity of foreign portfolio inflows to stock price may be justifiable. On the 
other hand, there is not much foreign capital that directly flows into the real estate market in 
these economies. Therefore, the case of momentum trading is not particularly applicable to the 
case of land price, and the assumption of contemporaneous exogeneity of foreign portfolio 
inflows to land price is reasonable.  
 
In order to make the assumption on stock price more reliable, the stock price data are 
constructed as an end-of-period value.
7 Consequently, capital inflows are a flow variable that 
represents the activities during the period, while stock price represents the value at the end-of-
period. Therefore, the assumption that other variables such as capital inflows are 
contemporaneously exogenous to stock price is a reasonable one.  
 
Finally, notice that the ordering between Y and P and between asset prices does not matter 
when the effects of shocks to capital inflows are examined.
8  
 
In addition, various extended models have been constructed. First, some extended models are 
considered with other factors that may affect asset prices through channels other than capital 
inflows. The extended model is: {Y, P, X, CAP, SP, LP}, where X is a new variable. X is ordered 
before CAP to control for both current and lagged factors in identifying structural shocks to 
capital flows. The domestic short-term interest rate and capital outflows are considered as X. 
Low domestic interest rates may increase asset prices while capital outflows may decrease 
asset prices. 
 
Second, to examine the effects on other relevant variables such as the nominal and real 
effective exchange rates, a new variable is added to the basic model. Because it is not clear 
whether capital inflows are contemporaneously exogenous to exchange rates (and vice versa), 
two types of models are considered with different orderings: {Y, P, X, CAP, SP, LP} and {Y, P, 
CAP, X, SP, LP}, where X is the nominal or real effective exchange rates.  
 
Five countries in our model are examined: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and 
Thailand.
9 The estimation period is from the first quarter of 1999 to the first quarter of 2006. 
Quarterly data is used.
10 The period prior to 1999 is excluded as economic behavior before and 
after the Asian crisis may be considered inconsistent within the framework of the study. A 
constant term and four lags are assumed.  
 
All data series have been obtained from the International Monetary Fund’s International 
Financial Statistics, with the exception of stock prices, land prices, and nominal and real 
effective exchange rates. Stock prices are from Bloomberg, while nominal and real effective 
exchange rates are from the Bank for International Settlements. Land prices have been 
obtained from the Bank of Korea webpage for Korea, ADB for Philippines, and Gochoco-
Bautista (2007) for the rest. 
 
                                                           
7  Using daily stock price data, the stock price at the last date during the quarter is constructed. 
8  Refer to Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999). 
9  Sufficient data series are not available for other economies. 
10  Some variables such as capital inflows are unavailable monthly.  
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C.   Empirical Results 
 
Figures 12 and 13 report the impulse responses of each variable with one standard error band 
(68% probability bands) per 10-quarter horizon. The names of shocks are reported at the top of 
the graph in each column. The names of responding variables are reported at the far left of the 
graph in each row. Figure 11 shows the results for the system including capital inflows while 
Figure 13 reports the results for the system including portfolio inflows. 
 
Although most interest is in the effects of capital inflow shocks—other shocks do not have much 
structural interpretation—some explanations of the effects of other shocks are provided to 
understand the general picture. Positive shocks to RGDP and PGDP tend to increase asset 
prices over time. PGDP shocks have a very strong effect on asset prices while RGDP shocks 
have a weak effect. These two factors are included to control for the factors that affect asset 
prices possibly through channels other than portfolio inflows. Indeed, because these factors are 
found to significantly affect asset prices, at least some factors are controlled. On the other hand, 
these two shocks do not seem to affect capital flows or portfolio flows strongly. Therefore, these 
two shocks can be inferred to affect asset prices without changing capital inflows much, that is, 
mostly through channels other than capital inflows. 
 
Then the effect of a positive shock to capital flows is examined, which is the main interest. To 
infer the nature of capital flow shocks, the responses of capital flows are examined first. Capital 
flows increase by 4% of trend GDP on impact. In the next quarter, the surge in capital flows 
decreases, but capital flows still increase by about 0.6% of trend GDP, and this modest surge 
continues over the next 2 years or so. 
 
In response to capital flow shocks, the stock price increases for 3 quarters. The increase in 
stock price is about 2–3% for the first 3 quarters. The land price also increases, but in general, 
the increase is more delayed than the increase in stock price. Land price increases about 1% on 
impact, and it further increases up to 3 quarters after the shock, and then decreases back to the 
initial level. The maximum effect of the 1.5% increase is found in the 3
rd quarter after the shock. 
 
The effect of portfolio inflows on asset prices is similar on the whole, but the effect seems to be 
weaker. Stock price increases on impact by about 1.5%, and decreases back to the initial level 
in 3 quarters. The land price increase is delayed, and the maximum effect, about a 1% increase, 
is found in about 5 or 6 quarters after the shock. These weaker effects seem to be related to the 
nature of portfolio inflow shocks. Portfolio inflows increase at about 2.5% on impact and 
decrease back to the initial level in the next period. That is, shocks to portfolio inflows are 
smaller and less persistent, which may explain why the effects of portfolio inflow shocks on 
asset prices are weaker than those of capital inflows. 
 
It is also interesting that neither capital inflow shocks nor portfolio inflow shocks affect domestic 
output and price much; the responses of output and price level are not significantly different 
from zero with 68% probability. Finally, positive shocks to asset prices increase capital inflows 
and portfolio inflows, although the effect is not so strong. Higher asset prices may attract foreign 
investors and induce capital inflows. 
 
To further confirm the above results, extended models were projected that additionally included 
domestic short-term interest rate or capital (or portfolio) outflows. Figure 15 reports the effects of 
capital inflows (or portfolio inflows), shocks on capital inflows (or portfolio inflows), stock prices, 
and land prices. ‘CAP-R,’ ‘CAP-OUT,’ ‘PORT-R,’ and ‘PORT-OUT’ stands for the model with 
capital inflows and short-term interest rates, the model with capital inflows and capital outflows,  
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the model with portfolio inflows and short-term interest rates, and the model with portfolio 
inflows and portfolio outflows. In these, the results are qualitatively similar to those of the basic 
five-variable model. 
 
Second, we examine the effects of capital (and portfolio) inflow shocks on real and nominal 
effective exchange rates using the extended model that includes the real or nominal effective 
exchange rates. The results for the models with the real exchange rates are reported in Figure 
15. The name of the type of shocks (either capital inflow shocks or portfolio inflow shocks) and 
the name of the responding variable (either nominal effective exchange rate [NEER], or real 
effective exchange rate [REER]) are defined at the top of each graph. Positive capital inflow 
shocks lead to real and nominal appreciation, which is different from zero with 68% probability in 
all specifications. The effects of portfolio inflow shocks are weaker, but nominal and real 
exchange rates tend to appreciate in all cases. Also, note that in most cases the responses of 
the nominal effective exchange rates are very similar to those of the real effective exchange 
rates, which suggests that real appreciation is mostly induced by nominal appreciation. 
 
In summary, a surge in capital inflows or portfolio inflows has positive effect on asset prices. 
Stock prices increase immediately as capital inflows hit directly. The land price increase is more 
delayed, which may be explained by a spillover effect. The real effective exchange rate 
appreciates, which is mostly explained by a nominal appreciation.  
 
However, the effects of capital inflows on the macro-economy seem to be limited, showing that 
output and the aggregate price level do not respond much. 
 
Next, the extent variation in asset prices is explained by capital inflow shocks is looked at by 
applying forecast error variance decomposition to asset prices. Table 4 reports the results for 
the basic empirical models. Portfolio inflow shocks explain no more than 5% of stock price and 
land price fluctuations in any horizon within 8 quarters. The contribution of capital inflow shocks 
is larger, but still not very significant. Capital inflow shocks explain less than 8% of stock price 
fluctuations in any horizon within 8 quarters. They explain less than 14% of land price 
fluctuations in any horizon within 8 quarters as well. Based on these results, although capital 
inflows affect asset prices significantly, it might be difficult to argue that the recent asset price 
surge in these emerging East Asian countries is mostly due to the recent increase in capital 
inflows. However, the estimation period does not include the most recent dates when asset 
price appreciation accelerated and serious concerns about capital flows emerged. If a more 
recent period is included, the role of capital flow shocks is likely to increase. In addition, 
whatever the exact contribution of capital inflow shocks to variations in asset prices, 
policymakers should pay attention to current asset price increases which have been very rapid 
in recent years. 
 
Finally, capital inflows surge in these emerging East Asian countries, and the empirical results 
suggest that capital inflow shocks do have some responsibility for the rise in asset prices in 
recent years. Therefore, the next question is whether the current surge in capital flows may 
destabilize macro-economies, as occurred during the Asian crisis. However, although a 
devastating crisis is less likely to occur now compared with the late 1990s, we cannot entirely 
exclude the possibility. First, the nature of the capital inflows is different. In the 1990s, a large 
portion of the surge in capital inflows was short-term debt, while an increase in foreign portfolio 
inflows has been a major part of inflows in recent years. Second, exchange rates were more 
tightly controlled in the 1990s. Today these countries apply more flexible exchange rate 
arrangements. Third, crisis-affected countries (for example, the PRC and Korea) have built up 
massive foreign exchange reserves and have organized a system of regional cooperation since  
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the financial crisis. Fourth, banking and financial sectors have been strengthened and many 
structural reforms implemented. In addition, the empirical results show that capital inflow shocks 
do not significantly boost the macro-economy, which may imply that the boom-bust cycle theory 




V.   Policy Considerations 
 
Emerging economies in Asia are using a variety of policy measures to deal with large capital 
inflows, including mitigating currency appreciation pressure by sterilization, prepaying foreign 
debt, encouraging capital outflows, and tightening credit growth by increasing lending rates and 
required reserves. 
 
A.   Increasing Exchange Rate Flexibility  
 
One way to enhance monetary autonomy is through the implementation of a floating exchange 
rate regime, which gives monetary authorities greater flexibility to handle fluctuations in 
monetary aggregates resulting from fluctuations in capital flows. The central bank may also 
intervene in the event of a capital flow reversal, curbing financial instability as a safety-net 
lender. 
 
The effects of capital inflows may vary depending on the exchange rate regime. Real exchange 
rate appreciation pressures may increase under floating- and fixed-exchange rates, but the 
adjustment under a floating regime is more direct and less costly. This reflects the different 
measures available under each type of regime: under a fixed regime the primary adjustment 
measure is a rise in inflation which naturally occurs as inflows stimulate domestic activity; under 
a floating regime, nominal exchange rate appreciation can be executed to augment adjustment. 
This also discourages inflows by reducing return in terms of foreign currencies. On the surface, 
adjustment under a floating regime tends to be less stable because of the use of the nominal 
exchange rate; however, the effects of these measures may be less detrimental in larger and 
deeper financial markets. 
 
Since the Asian financial crisis, most emerging economies in East Asia have moved toward 
more flexible exchange rate regimes (Kim, Kim, and Wang [2007], Kim (2006]) from pegs of 
varying degrees to the US dollar before, as the crisis-affected economies moved toward 
liberalization. Some have argued, such as in Kawai (2002) and Ogawa and Yang (2006), that as 
the crisis waned some economies moved toward a rigid fixity because of difficulty maintaining 
freer exchange rate regimes. Nevertheless, current exchange rate arrangements in East Asia 
differ from the pre-crisis era and vary across the region: a hard peg in Hong Kong, China; 
limited flexibility in the PRC and Malaysia; relatively flexible regimes in Korea, Thailand, and 
Indonesia; and a mostly free-floating regime in Japan. 
 
Moving toward more flexible exchange rate regimes enhances monetary maneuverability in a 
world of rising and volatile capital flows. However, greater exchange rate flexibility alone cannot 
cool an overheating economy or prevent the development of asset bubbles—it is one, but not 
the only available tool. 
 
 
                                                           
11  See Kim, Kim, and Wang (2004, 2005), who show that capital flow shocks affected macroeconomic conditions significantly in 
1990s.  
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For those economies that still maintain a highly-managed exchange rate, there is also the issue 
of how to make an orderly transition to a floating exchange rate regime. History tells us that 
more than half of such efforts have been disorderly and have fueled crises. Experience 
suggests that the following, general components are important for a successful exit from a fixed 
regime: (i) a deep and liquid foreign exchange market; (ii) a coherent policy governing central 
bank intervention in the foreign exchange market; (iii) an appropriate alternative nominal anchor 
to replace the fixed exchange rate; (iv) effective systems for reviewing and managing the 
exposure of the public and private sectors to exchange rate risk; (v) a gradual transition where 
possible; and (vi) a strengthening of fiscal policies, institutions, and banking systems.
12 For 
economies moving from highly-managed to floating exchange rate regimes, preparation is 
crucial. 
 
B.   Monetary Policy 
 
One way of dealing with capital inflows is to lower interest rates, which tends to reduce inflows 
and appreciation pressures by making interest arbitrage less attractive. However, cutting 
interest rates may further boost liquidity and add inflationary pressure, making this option less 
attractive when inflation is already high. At the same time, if asset prices are increasing, 
lowering interest rates may cause asset price bubbles.  
 
On the other hand, how monetary policy reacts to asset prices is highly controversial in general, 
both from an academic point of view and from a policy perspective. And there is wide debate 
about whether monetary policy should target asset prices at all. The arguments against suggest 
that (i) it is hard to determine the existence of an asset bubble ex-ante, and thus, targeting asset 
prices may destabilize the economy; (ii) to deflate an asset bubble, large hikes in interest rates 
may be required, leading to a substantial economic recession; and (iii) if a bubble bursts, 
monetary authorities can respond quickly by providing liquidity and thus prevent a severe 
decline in asset prices—dubbed the “Fed-view” in Roubini (2006)—making a preemptive 
monetary policy that targets asset prices unnecessary.
13 Nonetheless, several authors suggest 
that central banks should target asset prices as well as inflation and output gaps. Filardo (2001, 
2004) argues that the optimal monetary policy rule implies that asset prices generally enter into 
the reaction function of the monetary authority. If there were a rising bubble, monetary policy 
would be tighter than under a simple Taylor rule, while, when the bubble bursts, optimal policy 
would be easier than under the Taylor rule. Others also insist that highly leveraged asset 
acquisition fueled by excessive credit creation and asset misallocation may occur even when 
inflation is low. A monetary authority which focuses on the mean inflation rate alone may thus 
miss growing financial imbalances (Borio and Lowe (2002, 2004)).  
 
It is not obvious that emerging East Asian economies should implement monetary policies that 
target asset prices in general. However, Gochoco-Bautista (2007) shows that asset price booms 
matter in East Asia because they affect the probability of adverse macroeconomic 
developments, and insists that preemptive monetary policy is required to deal with asset price 
appreciations in the region. In addition, recent experience in the United Kingdom, Australia, and 
New Zealand suggests that it is possible to react to the formation of bubbles with a moderate 
and gradual monetary policy tightening—without causing a financial and economic crash.  
 
 
                                                           
12  Refer to Eichengreen (1999) and Duttagupta, Fernandez, and Karacadag (2005). 
13  See Miskin (2007). Exponents of the Fed-view include Schwartz (2002), Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001), Gilchrist and Leahy 
(2002), and Goodfriend (2003).  
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The Bank of Korea (BOK) tightened monetary policy in 2006 to moderate housing prices, raising 
its benchmark call rate from 4.25% to 4.50% in August of that year. Inflation pressures persisted 
then due to economic recovery and high oil prices. But this implies that even if the BOK is not 
targeting asset price appreciations directly, it is indirectly considering the potential inflationary 
pressures. 
 
The PRC has also recently responded to rising asset prices in the real estate market, where 
prices were up 5.5% in 2006 from already very high levels. The government has tried to cool the 
real estate boom with a series of measures, including increasing interest rates for loans and the 
minimum down payments for home buyers, and restricting property investment by foreigners. 
New fee and tax policies were also adopted, including a new land-use fee applied to 
construction and land newly converted from agricultural or unused land, a 5.5% capital gain tax 
on residential property sold within 2 years of purchase, and a land value-added tax for real 
estate development enterprises. 
 
However, monetary tightening is a limited policy option in the emerging East Asian economies, 
because higher interest rates can induce more portfolio inflows and add to liquidity expansion. 
At the same time, exchange rates will also appreciate. This reduces export price 
competitiveness. 
 
In the presence of strong external inflows, many economies use sterilized foreign currency 
market intervention to neutralize appreciation pressures on the exchange rate. Sterilized 
intervention may not be completely effective, however, leading to increased domestic liquidity 
that can feed into asset markets. Even if ineffective, sterilized intervention has some important 
effects on domestic asset markets. First, domestic interest rates will be higher than otherwise. 
With inflows into domestic bond markets, interest rates would tend to fall but sterilization will at 
least partially offset the drop. Thus, any gap between foreign and domestic interest rates will 
persist, encouraging capital inflows to continue. Second, sterilization increases outstanding 
domestic government bonds, which may increase the size of public debt. This can undermine 
the credibility of macroeconomic policy, setting up a potential reversal in capital flows. Third, 
with sterilization, the monetary authority increases the holdings of foreign currency assets, but 
decreases the holdings of domestic government bonds. This can be very costly because the 
domestic bonds are likely to provide higher interest payments than foreign currency assets. 
Fourth, sterilized intervention may hamper further financial reforms. Commercials banks would 
hold up the central bank debts. To cut the cost, a lower interest rate may be applied to the debts. 
It may eventually increase the burden of commercial banks or become a control over domestic 
interest rates. 
 
The monetary authority may increase reserve requirements or the discount rate to prevent the 
increase in money supply from reserve accumulation. However, these policies also have some 
problems: they can be viewed as increased regulation on financial markets—countering 
financial market liberalization. And they could distort the banking system, for example, if 
participants use counterproductive ways to bypass the regulations. 
 
The PRC has put in place several measures related to reserve requirements and discount rates. 
The excess liquidity can be traced to the government’s intervention in the foreign exchange 
market and the credits extended through an inefficient banking sector. The PRC’s growing 
concern about excess liquidity in the financial system was clearly reflected in the People’s Bank 
of China’s (PBC) decision to raise the reserve requirement ratio and the lending rate. The PBC 
implemented a combination of policy instruments, strengthened guidance on credit policy, and 
enhanced communication with financial institutions through window guidance to help them meet  
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state requirements on macroeconomic management, reasonably controlled credit growth, and 
an adjusted lending structure.  
 
However, the PRC’s efforts have not yet been successful in cooling equity markets. In 2006, 
stock market reforms—especially those reducing the overhang of non-tradable shares—boosted 
stock prices. The benchmark Shanghai Composite Index rose to 2675.47 points by the end of 
2006 from 1161.06 points at the beginning of the year. That re-invigorated public enthusiasm for 
stocks, and funds going into mutual funds increased dramatically. The government intensified 
measures to ban banks from extending loans for stock investment in January 2007. 
 
The Bank of Korea also increased the average reserve requirement ratio in December 2006, to 
3.8% from 3.0%. This helped slow liquidity expansion slightly as the capacity of financial 
institutions to provide credit weakened. 
 
In general, monetary policy options in emerging East Asian economies for mitigating the 
adverse effects of huge capital inflows are limited. And potential difficulties lie in complicated 
policy objectives, because of existing trade-offs between domestic and external objectives. To 
temper surging capital inflows, lowering interest rates may be a good option. But this will 
increase domestic liquidity and could foster the formation of asset bubbles. At the same time, to 
curtail rising asset prices, monetary tightening could be considered, but this will pressure the 
exchange rate and hurt exports.  
 
Nevertheless, current asset price increases should be carefully managed by monetary policy at 
least in the short-run. In economies with huge gains—such as the PRC—a moderate short-term 
interest rate increase can help to alleviate price bubbles. A slight increase in short-term interest 
rates will affect credit conditions and decrease leverage and excessive risk taking by investors. 
This in turn affects asset prices. It also has less influence on exchange rates if the increase in 
interest rates is minimal. Thailand and Indonesia—where asset price gains were not as strong 
but inflationary pressures were high and domestic demand weak—were able to cut interest 
rates. It may help to limit capital inflows by closing the gap caused by the interest rate 
differential.  
 
C.   Capital Controls and Liberalizing Capital Outflows 
 
In principle, capital controls can curb disproportionate amounts of unproductive capital inflows—
such as a tax on inflows in a situation where domestic agents would tend to borrow heavily 
internationally. Capital controls may also allow monetary authorities to regain some control over 
policy. Nevertheless, in certain situations—for example, in economies with well-developed 
capital markets—such controls may prove ineffective in the long run. Agents may find new ways 
to circumnavigate the rules, such as rerouting inflows through other channels, thereby reducing 
effective control over the financial system. Liberalizing restrictions on capital outflows to offset 
inflows may be another option, although this may have the reverse effect and actually 
encourage inflows and increase investor confidence. 
 
According to Magud and Reinhart (2006), controls on capital inflows may: (i) lead to a greater 
independence of monetary policy, (ii) alter the composition of capital flows in favor of longer-
term investments, (iii) possibly reduce real exchange rate pressures, and (iv) have little effect on 
the volume of net flows. However, capital controls may also have adverse effects: they may 
raise domestic financing costs, reduce market disciple, lead to inefficient allocation of financial 
capital, distort decision-making at the firm level, and be difficult and costly to enforce (Forbes 
2005). While it is true that capital controls may never be enough to completely suppress  
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international capital flows, at the very least they can be selectively used to suppress certain 
types of capital flows by raising costs. 
 
In general, capital controls may appear as restricting the purchase of domestic financial 
products by nonresidents and overseas financial products by domestic residents. PRC, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand all control capital flows in many ways—especially 
short-term capital outflows—whereas Korea has almost completely removed restrictions on 
capital flows. Capital control and regulation also come in the form of restrictions on foreign 
financial institutions in entering domestic financial markets, and can appear as a cap on foreign 
equity ownership in domestic financial institutions, which can reduce competition in the domestic 
financial market and ensure steady profits for domestic financial institutions. Such restrictions 
have disappeared in advanced economies, but a good number of Asian economies still limit the 
access of foreign financial institutions. 
 
There are several notable features of capital controls in emerging East Asian economies—with 
more restrictions on capital outflows than on capital inflows (Table 4). This is a reflection of the 
concern in some economies about capital flight after having experienced the Asian currency 
crisis. And in some economies, control on bond-related capital inflows is stronger than on stock-
related capital inflows. In the PRC, foreign investment in stocks is allowed, but limited to 
qualified foreign institutional investors (QFIIs), while foreign investment in local bonds is 
prohibited. Korea has restricted foreign investment in the bond market more than in the stock 
market, compared with pre-crisis levels. 
 
Unlike the Asian economies, openness of other economies’ capital markets is rather high, with 
few restrictions on the purchase of financial products by foreign or domestic investors. Latin 
American capital markets are also less regulated, but it is notable that capital flows are 
concentrated to and from North American economies, and cross-relations with other regions are 
limited. This raises questions about why such a phenomenon occurs. 
 
In general, capital controls do not seem to be a viable option to curb the short-term effects of 
capital inflows in Asia, although it might be a worthwhile way to mitigate reversals in capital 
flows in the long run. Thailand imposed the foreign capital reserve requirement in December 
2006 in an attempt to prevent the Thai baht’s appreciation from hurting exports—due to the 
huge increase in capital inflows from abroad. The requirement implied that foreigners bringing 
portfolio capital into Thailand had to deposit 30% of the funds on account at the central bank. If 
investors wish to withdraw their funds within 1 year, they will be refunded only two-thirds of the 
amount. This is a capital tax on speculative flows over a period of less than 1 year. However, it 
was unsuccessful in suppressing the appreciation of the baht against the US dollar in 2007.  
 
Lifting restrictions on capital outflows by private investors in these countries may mitigate the 
adverse effects of huge capital inflows. Most emerging East Asian economies can further 
liberalize restrictions on capital outflows and achieve a greater degree of symmetry in inflow and 
outflow controls. As restrictions on capital outflows are lifted, private investors have access to 
more diversified financial assets. Furthermore, they need not pursue limited investment 
opportunities in the domestic market. This may reduce the upward pressure on exchange rates 
and prevent asset bubbles from forming in the domestic capital market. However, countries 
should be careful in removing restrictions on capital outflows as it may aggravate the situation 
should capital flows reverse. 
 
Korea has encouraged more overseas investment by financial institutions and individuals to 
mitigate the negative effects of huge capital inflows into the domestic capital market. In 2007, a  
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temporary tax exemption for 3 years was applied to capital gains generated from overseas stock 
investments by domestic investment trust and investment companies. The government also 
eased regulations in order to boost overseas real estate investment through indirect investment. 
For example, the acquisition limit on overseas real estate by domestic residents for investment 
purposes will be raised from the current $1 million to $3 million.
14  
 
Given the relatively high risks involved in individual investment in emerging markets, most 
emerging East Asian economies encouraged authorized fund-type overseas investment by 
individual domestic investors. Malaysia increased the limit of holdings of foreign assets by 
institutional investors and investment trusts to 30% in 2005, from 10%, and raised the limit again 
to 50% in 2007. The PRC also implemented a set of measures to provide individual investors 
greater access to foreign financial assets. Individual savers are allowed to have foreign 
exchange and foreign exchange-linked products with domestic currency funds. In addition, 
individual investors can purchase foreign mutual funds up to $20,000 through QFIIs. 
 
D.   Fiscal Policy 
 
The government may tighten fiscal policy to calm an overheating economy to counter some of 
the effects of capital inflows. In addition, decreasing government spending could reduce the 
relative price of non-tradables and relieve the appreciation pressure on the real exchange rate.
15  
 
In East Asian economies with high inflationary pressure, a fiscal contraction may be an 
important option because an alternative contraction policy (that is, a monetary contraction) can 
cool the economy but further attract capital inflows and raise exchange rates.  
 
Most East Asian economies have displayed a balanced fiscal position for decades. Since 1998, 
the average budget deficit in the six emerging East Asian economies is a mere 1.6%. The 
Philippines, which had shown the highest budget deficit, reduced the shortfall to 2.7% of GDP in 
2005, from 5.3% in 2002. The PRC budget deficit declined from 2002 and has recently shown a 
small surplus, as has Korea. The other economies have kept budget deficits low. Therefore, it 
seems that fiscal contraction is not necessary for the sake of reducing fiscal burden. However, 
tightening fiscal policy will reduce the impact of portfolio inflows by contracting domestic 
demand, and therefore limiting inflation and real appreciation.  
 
Nonetheless, authorities should be very careful in implementing fiscal contraction. Fiscal policy 
is subject to long decision lags, compared with very volatile and unpredictable capital flows. For 
example, by the time a fiscal contraction is implemented, the surge in capital flows might have 
subsided, in which case the fiscal contraction can actually worsen the situation.  
 
Some tax policies have also been used to cool asset markets—the PRC’s new tax policies on 
the real estate market are a case in point. In addition, in May 2007, to calm an overheating 
stock market, PRC authorities raised the stamp duty on stock trading to 0.3% from 0.1%. These 
policies affect a specific asset market, so they are different from traditional fiscal policy that 
targets macroeconomic conditions. At any rate, the new tax policy on the stock market had a 
significant short-term impact on PRC equity prices. The effect may be short-lived and the policy 
itself may be viewed as going against the general trend of financial market liberalization, but 
such policies may eventually discourage short-term trading that is an important source of short-
term volatility. 
                                                           
14  In Korea, foreign real estate purchase by domestic residents has been permitted since May 2006.  
15  See Eichengreen and Choudry (2005) for a fuller discussion of the use of fiscal policy to offset the effects of capital inflows.  
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E.   Financial Market Regulation and Supervision 
 
If a government cannot directly control capital inflows—and is concerned about an excessive 
appreciation of asset prices—strengthening financial regulation and supervision should be 
considered in order to prevent an unstable bursting of and asset bubble. When there is excess 
liquidity and lower interest rates in the market, it is highly plausible for economic agents to take 
risky investments. The government should access and influence risk-taking behavior in financial 
institutions through a range of qualitative and quantitative methods. These measures include 
restrictions on portfolio composition, risk-based capital requirements, loan loss provisioning, and 
stress testing of market-risk exposures. Any concerns can then be addressed using regulatory 
measures directed at specific asset markets. This will be all the more effective if a large source 
of funds flowing into asset markets derives from domestic agents. In general, a more targeted 
approach may reduce the chance of unintended macroeconomic effects of broad-based 
monetary, fiscal, or exchange rate policies—or even capital controls. To the extent that the 
banking sector is funding speculative investments in stock and real estate markets, exposures 
can be closely monitored or reduced through selective imposition of higher reserve 
requirements, higher down payment requirements for real estate purchases, or higher reserve 
margins for equity investments. However, effective financial market regulation and supervision 
requires well-trained professionals with independence, professional standards, and the ability to 
engage sophisticated market players. Therefore, the PRC, Korea, and Thailand, which are 
experiencing surges in capital inflows, should expand their risk management policies on credit 
expansion to equity and real estate markets.  
 
 
VI.   Conclusion  
 
In recent years, emerging East Asian economics experienced (i) large capital inflows, especially 
a surge in portfolio inflows, and (ii) an appreciation of asset prices such as stock prices, land 
prices, and nominal and real exchange rates. This paper first documented the recent trend in 
capital inflows and asset prices in these economies, and reviewed how a surge in capital inflows 
can increase asset prices. The paper empirically investigated the effects of capital inflows on 
asset prices by employing a panel VAR model.  
 
The empirical results suggest that capital inflows indeed contributed to asset price appreciation 
in the region, although capital inflow shocks explain a relatively small part of asset price 
fluctuations. Positive capital flow shocks increase stock prices immediately and land prices with 
some delay. They also cause nominal and real exchange rates to appreciate.  
 
How to manage these capital inflows was then discussed. As yet, a one-size-fits-all solution to 
the problems that capital inflows present does not seem to exist. Depending on the policy 
objectives of individual economies, an effective mix of available options and instruments must 
be crafted carefully as preventative medicine to avoid disruptions caused by any external shock 
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Table 1: Change in Foreign Reserve (% annual) 
 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
China, People’s Rep. of  5.7  6.7 28.1 35.0 40.2 50.6 33.7 30.1 
Indonesia 16.4  7.8  -4.4  13.7 12.9  0.0  -5.6 24.1 
Korea, Rep. of  42.4  29.9  6.9 18.1 28.0 28.2 5.7  13.6 
Malaysia 19.7  -7.4  4.2 13.0 31.4 50.3  6.0 17.6 
Philippines 43.1  -1.4  2.9  -1.1  2.4  -3.9 21.4 25.7 
Thailand 18.2  -6.0  1.1  17.6 8.0  18.5 4.2  28.8 
 





Table 2: Change in Monetary Supply (M2) (% annual) 
 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
China, People’s Rep. of  14.7 15.4 14.4 16.9 19.6 14.5 16.7 16.9 
Indonesia 11.9  15.6  13.0 4.7 8.1 8.1  16.4  14.9 
Korea, Republic of  5.1  5.2 8.1  14.0 3.0 6.3 7.0  12.5 
Malaysia 13.7  5.2  2.2  5.8 11.1 25.4 15.4 16.6 
Philippines 19.3  4.8  6.9 21.0  4.2 10.2 10.3 21.4 
Thailand 2.2  3.7  4.2  2.6 4.9 5.4 8.2 6.0 
 





Table 3: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of Asset Prices 
 
  Contribution of Capital Inflows Shocks  Contribution of Portfolio Inflows Shocks 
  Stock Price  Land Price  Stock Price  Land Price 
1 quarter  5.5 (3.8)  3.5 (2.9)  1.8 (2.0)  0.9 (1.1) 
2 quarters  4.5 (3.5)  4.1 (3.7)  1.9 (2.0)  1.5 (1.8) 
4 quarters  6.5 (4.8)  8.8 (7.0)  3.0 (2.9)  2.7 (3.0) 








Table 4: Restrictions on Capital Flows in Emerging East Asian Economies 
 
 
Restrictions on purchase 
locally by nonresidents 
Restrictions on purchase 
abroad by residents 













Yes*  Not  
permitted 
Not  
permitted  Yes Approval  Authorized 
banks only Yes Yes 
Indonesia Yes  No  Yes  Less  
than 1%  No Yes  Yes  No 
Korea,  
Rep. of  No No No  No  No  No  Approval  No 
Malaysia No  Yes  No  No  Approval  Yes Yes  Yes 
Philippines Registration  Registration  Yes  No  Approval  Approval  Yes  Yes 
Thailand Yes  No  No  No  Approval  Approval  Approval  Approval 
 
Source: Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, International Monetary Fund, 2005 




Figure 1: Trends of Gross Capital Inflows in Emerging East 






















































































































Figure 2: Emerging East Asian Economies’ Gross Capital  
























































































































Figure 3: Patterns of Gross Capital Inflows in Emerging East  


























































































































Figure 4: Trends of Gross Capital Outflows in Emerging East  

























































































































Figure 5: Patterns of Capital Outflows in Emerging East Asian 














































































































































    Source: Bloomberg. 
Figure 7: 10-year Government Bond Yields
Figure 6: Composite Stock Price Indexes: ASEAN-4, PRC, and Korea 
 



































































Figure 9: Nominal Effective Exchange Rate
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1   Weighted average of a basket of 51 bilateral exchange rates adjusted by relative consumer prices. The
weights are derived from manufacturing trade flows. 
2 An increase is an appreciation. 
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1 Weekly averages of JCI (Indonesia), KLCI (Malaysia), PCOMP (Philippines), SET (Thailand), and Shenzhen 
Composite Index (PRC) 
 


































































1 Weighted average of a basket of 51 bilateral exchange rates adjusted by relative consumer prices. 
The weights are derived from manufacturing trade flows. 
2 An increase is an appreciation. 
 
Source: Bank for International Settlements. 





Figure 10: Real Effective Exchange Rate
1
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